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Withholding of Life-Supporting Treatment 
from the Mentally Incompetent 
John J. Paris, S.J. 
Father Paris who received his master's degree from Harvard and his 
Ph.D. from the University of Southern California, is an associate pro-
fessor of social ethics at Holy Cross College. During this past year, he 
has been a visiting scholar at the Yale University Law School. 
The troubling issue of withholding life-supporting medical treat-
ment from dying patients is exacerbated in the case of the mentally 
incompetent. We need not look to a brain-damaged Karen Ann Quinlan 
or the even more bizarre Rosemarie Maniscalco case for examples. 
State hospitals and institutions are ready sources of mentally dis-
turbed or severely retarded individuals who cannot give informed con-
sent for medical treatment and who, when terminally ill, present diffi-
cult dilemmas for the hospital staff. One example, that of Joseph 
Saikewicz, a profoundly retarded 67-year-old man who had been insti-
tutionalized in Massachusetts schoolS for the retarded since 1923, pro-
vides a graphic case study of the legal, medical, and moral dimensions 
of the problem. 
In 1976, Saikewicz, whose IQ was 10 and whose mental age was 
the equivalent of a two year and eight month old child, became ill. The 
diagnosis was acute myelogenous leukemia, an invariably fatal disease 
which, though non-curable, may in some instances be slowed down by 
chemotherapy treatments. 
The question facing his physician and the Belchertown State 
School authorities where he had resided for nearly 50 years was what 
was the proper treatment. There is no question that the staff was 
concerned with Saikewicz's welfare. The school physician had sent 
him to the University of Massachusetts Medical Center for initial diag-
nosis and then transferred him to the Bayside Medical Center for 
further consultation with hematology and oncology specialists. As the 
Belchertown medical director was later to testify: "I'd like to do our 
best to treat him as a patient; that he deserves like anybody else .... 
Our concern is to find expert people who can guide us as to what kind 
of treatment he should receive." 
Those involved recognized the complexity of the problem: without 
chemotherapy Saikewicz would probably die within two months; with 
it there would be a 30-50% chance of a remission that could prolong 
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his life 2-13 months. Saikewicz was unable to understand the situation 
and his family did not want to get involved. Furthermore, the pro-
posed therapy had serious adverse side effects. To add to the dilemma, 
the staff was aware that the overwhelming majority of similarly sit-
uated competent patients opt for the therapy. 
At this juncture the school appealed to the Hampshire County 
Probate Court for permission to begin the chemotherapy. The court 
appointed a guardian ad litem to recommend whether the treatment 
should be commenced. Initially impressed with the fact that nearly all 
of the "normal" patients with a similar diagnosis elected chemo-
therapy, the guardian was inclined to favor treatment. Further conver-
sations with Saikewicz's physicians, however, convinced him that the 
patient's inability to comprehend or cooperate with the treatments 
would not be normal. That fact led the guardian to change his mind. 
He recommended that no treatment be given. 
On May 13, 1976 the Probate Court held a brief hearing in which 
several physicians testified that because of Saikewicz's profoundly 
retarded condition and his inability to understand or communicate 
concerning his medical disabilities, they advised against treatment. At 
first the judge was unpersuaded. In part his initial reluctance hinged 
on his personal assessment that, "If I had a serious disease and with 
treatment I could live another five or eight or ten years, whatever, I'd 
rather take the treatment than just take the chance of dying tomorrow 
or next week." 
He shifted his position after one of the physicians reiterated the 
realistic possibilities and the difficulty of carrying out the protocol. 
The doctor also noted the deteriorated quality Saikewicz's life would 
take even if the medication proved successful. The Probate Court, 
though, was uneasy with its order to withhold treatment and asked for 
an appellate review of its ruling. On motion of the Attorney General, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted direct review. 
One index of the case's moral complexity is the fact that the 
Attorney General's office submitted competing briefs in the case: the 
Attorney General sought to reverse the decision while the Civil Rights 
Division supported the order. Additional amicus briefs were submitted 
by several groups interested in the mentally retarded. 1 
On July 9, 1976 the Supreme Judicial Court by divided vote up-
held the Probate Court order. It stated that an opinion would be 
forthcoming. On Sept. 6, 1976 Joseph Saikewicz died peacefully of 
bronchial pneumonia, a product of his acute leukemia that by court 
order remained untreated until the end. 
Among the multiple issues raised in this case the primary question 
was, should Saikewicz have been treated? The various briefs and amici 
arguments along with the vast medical, moral, and legal literature now 
available on the subject of death and dying provide the sources for a 
tentative answer. 
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Arguments for Treatment 
Some very strong positions were advanced in the briefs for the 
state's absolute duty to preserve the life of a mentally incompetent 
terminally-ill patient. Not to take every measure possible it was 
argued, would be to devalue the life of the mentally retarded patient. 
The authors of the Attorney General's brief, fearing "quality-of-life" 
judgments would devalue the mentally retarded, contend that "treat-
ment decisions should be tailored to the 'medical needs' and not to 
the 'medical and personal needs' of the incompetent patient." 2 
While there is a serious need to be aware of and to guard against 
those who would insert rational utility tests for the preservation of 
life, that position has horrendous implications for the medical treat-
ment of the mentally incompetent. Such a stance is a cruel caricature 
of the very values its proponents hope to preserve. It fails to accept 
the fact that under such a standard the patient is reduced from a 
person to a disease; he is an entity stripped of all meaning save that of 
"medical interest." 
Such critics also discount the difficulty of administering chemo-
therapy to a profoundly retarded individual. Because he would not 
understand what was being done to him such a patient tends to pull 
out the IV's and attack those attempting to help him. To prevent that 
from happening, the patient would have to be placed in restraints. To 
the critics of the court's decision these conditions are not sufficient 
grounds to withhold the treatment: " Such a conclusion would be 
unwarranted given that the doctors testified that chemotherapy would 
be difficult rather than impossible to administer." 3 
The assistant Attorneys General who held that view are supported 
by the Developmental Disabilities Law Project group which maintains 
that, "It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold on to it 
however burdened." 4 For them there is but one guiding principle: 
"Lives which can be saved must be saved."5 
The position tbat the physician must do everything possible to 
secure maximum p-atient longevity regardless of the condition of the 
patient is not a novel one. It is an attitude, though, that is increasingly 
under criticism in both the medical and ethical communities. 
The deontological or rule-oriented standard articulated in that 
model does have the advantage of guaranteeing consistency in treat-
ment and the avoidance of " quality-of-life" jUdgments. But the very 
attempt to treat disparate categories of patients as if they were similar 
is to introduce differing standards of treatment. Even if 100% of the 
competent leukemia victims elected chemotherapy, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the same treatment must be administered to others 
who have substantially diminished capat;;ities to understand and accept 
the therapy. 
The vitalist doctrine of utmost medical care whenever possible, 
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coupled with the refusal to accept the position that differing con-
ditions sometimes mandate differing care, finds its logical culmina-
tion in the Maine Medical Center's handling of Baby Boy Houle. 6 That 
case, which is frequently cited as legal precedent by the critics of the 
Saikewicz decision, involved a horribly deformed newborn. His entire 
left side was malformed; he had no left ear, was practically without a 
left eye, had a deformed left hand; some of his vertebrae were not 
fused. Furthermore, he was afflicted with esophageal fistula which 
prevented feeding by mouth and allowed fluids to push up into his 
lungs. As his condition deteriorated he contracted pneumonia and had 
several convulsive seizures which led to suspicion of severe brain 
damage. 
The tracheal esophageal fistula, which most immediately threat-
ened the infant's life, is remediable by relatively simple surgery. The 
attending physician and the boy's father wanted to forego the pro-
cedure. Several of the other physicians objected and took the case to 
court. Superior Court Judge David G. Roberts' opinion forcefully 
articulates the vitalist position. He stated that regardless of the new-
born's condition, "At the moment of live birth there does exist a 
human being entitled to the fullest protection of the law." Dismissing 
the attending physician's opinion that the massive deformities and 
probable brain damage had rendered the life not worth saving because 
it was beyond the scope of medical expertise, he ruled that the only 
issue to be decided was the medical feasibility of the proposed treat-
ment. In his view, if the corrective surgery is medically necessary and 
medically feasible, it must be undertaken. And he so ordered. (The 
child died shortly after the court mandated surgery.) 
Arguments Against Treatment 
From Judge Roberts' perspective and that of the critics of the 
Saikewicz decision, courts should not consider the "quality-of-life" of 
defective or retarded individuals when life-saving measures are neces-
sary. The medical and moral literature, though, evidences a more com-
plex and sophisticated approach to the problem. Richard McCormick, 
S.J. of Georgetown University's Kennedy Center for Bioethics, has 
provided the most thought-provoking analysis of the issue. In an essay 
in The Journal of the American Medical Association, he writes that 
advances in medical technology have brought us to the point where we 
can easily transform yesterday's medical failures into today's suc-
cesses.7 Translated into practice this means we must shift the question 
from, "Can we keep this patient alive?" to "What kind of life are we 
saving?" Such questions are irretrievably "quality-of-life" judgments 
and, McCormick argues, there is no avoiding them. 
Our task, he writes, is to draw lines, develop criteria, and formulate 
guidelines for handling such cases, not to retreat behind talismanic 
incantations of "the sanctity of life" and "the worth of every individ-
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ual." Such slogans in his opinion are the weapons of ideological battle, 
not the tools for analysis and enlightenment. 
McCormick's own framework is developed from the traditional 
Judeo-Christian understanding that "It is neither human nor unchris-
tian to say that there comes a point where an individual's condition 
itself represents the negation of anything truly human." When that 
point is reached, he asks, is not the best treatment no treatment? 
There is, of course, the always lurking danger in these decisions 
that an individual will be valued for his functional utility, what he can 
do, rather than who he is. A sad example of that mentality occurred in 
the famous Johns Hopkins case in which a mongoloid child with an 
intestinal blockage (duodenal atresia) was allowed to starve to death 
over a fifteen day period because his parents felt, "It would be unfair 
to the other children to raise them with a mongoloid."8 James Gustaf-
son, the University of Chicago ethicist, in a thorough and convincing 
criticism of that incident, argues that the presumption of life is not 
qualified by intelligence nor does it yield to inconvenience. There 
comes a point, however, when inconvenience becomes suffering and 
suffering becomes unbearable. At that stage, he believes, the individual 
no longer has an absolute moral duty of sustaining the burden. 
Application to Saikewicz 
The McCormick-Gustafson position cuts a middle ground between 
medical vitalism (preserving life at all costs) and medical pessimism 
(taking life when it seems frustrating, burdensome or "useless"). It 
also aids us in a determination of how best to proceed in a case like 
that of Joseph Saikewicz. Following their guidelines, one neither opts 
for a medical feasibility test nor the unreflective dismissal of any 
treatment of profoundly retarded individuals. 
In the decision-making process we must begin with a determination 
of what is going on and the most appropriate response to that reality. 
In the instant case that involves an understanding of Saikewicz's con-
dition and the effect chemotherapy will have upon it. Only then is one 
able to make a "risk-benefit" assessment tailored to the specific needs 
of the individual. 
Much useful information for that task is provided in the Mental 
Health Legal Advisors' Committee's depiction of the mental world of 
the profoundly retarded: 
These people are incapable of communicating on anything but a momentary 
concrete level. They can experience pain and when they do, they scream 
and cry and flail about with their arms and legs. More importantly for the 
purposes of their undergoing painful therapy which might have future bene-
fit is the fact that such individuals have no concept of time, especially 
future time. They are also aware, but do not comprehend, changes in sur-
roundings and they tend to react to such shifts with fright and insecurity 
which is frequently expressed loudly and vehemently . 9 
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A further analysis of the problem of utilizing chemotherapy treat-
ment on the profoundly retarded is found in the Probate Court tran-
script where the undisputed testimony of all the physicians involved 
was that such patients have no ability to understand or cooperate in 
the treatment. When that fact was coupled with the severe nausea, 
anemia, bladder irritation and the susceptibility to infection that 
accompanies chemotherapy, the conclusion of the medical testimony 
was that, "It is going to be virtually impossible to carry out the 
treatment. " 
"The issue," as one of the physicians summarized it, "boils down 
to the quality of his life now and when he goes through the treatment. 
If treated, he certainly will suffer. The low probability that he will go 
into remission has to be measured against that reality." Still another 
factor is the realization that the treatment might actually shorten his 
life. A final consideration is the fact that if the leukemia is left undis-
turbed, Saikewicz will die relatively quickly without pain or dis-
comfort. 
Those who subscribe to the proposition that "it is basic to the 
human condition to seek life and hold on to it however bur-
dened," found support in much of the legal literature until the 
landmark Karen Ann Quinlan case forced the New Jersey Supreme 
Court to recognize the incredible hardships medical technology can 
now exact from a patient. In Quinlan for the first time we find a court 
ruling that "a patient cannot be forced to endure the unendurable." 11 
Attitudes Toward Death 
Stewart Alsop perhaps best summed up the situation in a brilliantly 
insightful description of his own heroic but ultimately unsuccessful 
fight against leukemia. "There comes a time," he writes, "when it is 
both wrong as well as useless to continue to resist .... The dying man 
needs to die, just as the sleepy man needs to sleep." 12 When that time 
comes further expenditures of effort and expertise are not only futile, 
they are foolish. 
At such a point Paul Ramsey states, "We must cease doing what 
was once called for and begin doing what is called for now: caring for 
the dying." 13 That care involves comforting and companying with the 
dying person, not for useless struggles at extending his temporo-spatial 
existence. As Ramsey reminds us, it is the person, not his disease, who 
calls for our ministrations. In such circumstances the most the phy-
sician can promise is care, not a cure. 
Ramsey's suggestions find reinforcement in Elizabeth Kubler-Ross' 
well-known studies on death and dying. These reveal that the most 
important problem for the dying is not death itself, but how he 
dies.l4 For her the patient's chief fear is being isolated or abandoned 
or being placed in a situation where people with untreatable diseases 
are "kept alive indefinitely by means of tubes inserted into their 
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stomachs, or into their veins, or into their bladders, or into their 
rectums - victims of massive and unwarranted medical intervention 
upon their own particular death. "15 
In reference to a terminal cancer case one compassionate physician 
has written, "It is inhuman to drag the dying patient to radiation 
therapy, to transfuse him repeatedly, or to give massive toxic and 
nauseating chemotherapy to relieve one tiny facet of an intolerable 
existence, thereby dragging it out for a few more agonizing days or 
weeks." 16 To do so to an incompetent patient is simply an added 
cruelty. 
One might ask how we get ourselves into such a plight. In part it is 
because death is perceived not as a natural function of life, but as an 
enemy to be overcome. Thus begins the application of all available 
medical resources, regardless of the cost, to the patient or his family. 
That position, of course, has always been contrary to Catholic moral 
thought where the saving of a life has never been viewed as an absolute 
or inflexible norm. Unfortunately, that vision is not always shared by 
the medical profession. 
The medical and moral communities frequently do not even share a 
common understanding of such traditional distinctions as "ordinary / 
extraordinary" means of saving a life. Physicians have tended to trans-
late "ordinary" into "customary" or what is readily available. "Extra-
ordinary" is then understood as " heroic" or experimental treatment. 
With such an interpretation the "state of the art," not the state of the 
patient, is the major determinant of usage. To the moralist, non-
medical features are equally dispositive and must be factored into the 
treatment calculus. 
Paul Ramsey calls for a "reformed" medical understanding of the 
terms so that depending on the condition of the. patient even the 
simplest and most easily applicable medication, if offering no reason-
able hope of benefit to the person, is deemed "extraordinary" and 
thus elective. Using his focus on "the person in whom the diseases 
inhere" and not on the disease itself, it is possible to understand why 
the dying patient should be treated differently from an otherwise 
healthy individual stricken with the same disease. For one, the treat-
ment, painful and costly though it be, is endurable for the promise of 
restored health it holds ; for the other the suffering is but an added and 
unnecessary burden. 
Seen from this perspective, the administration of chemotherapy 
which would inexplicably change the character of Joseph Saikewicz's 
life from a peaceful routine into a bewildering nightmare of pain, fear, 
and physical restraint, would surely constitute "extraordinary" treat-
ment. And if he has no obligation to undergo such treatment-
common though it might be for other patients - neither has the physi-
cian any moral obligation to provide it ; nor the judge to order it. 17 
One last rationale for treatment must be noted. The Attorney Gen-
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eral's office was justifiably sensitive to the potential for devaluing the 
lives of the mentally incompetent implicit in state-sanctioned with-
holding of medical treatment. To obviate that danger, its brief argued 
that "allowing a leukemia victim to live a bit longer, although in pain, 
certainly seems reasonable to preserve the principle of 'the sanctity of 
life'." The danger warned of is real enough,18 but it is one that a 
vigilant court and a watchful public must guard against, not one that a 
non-competent individual must involuntarily suffer to ward off. Any 
treatment the profoundly retarded leukemia victim undergoes must be 
premised on protecting his "best interests" not on upholding some 
abstract principle. 
Given the choice between a peaceful "natural" death and an 
incomprehensibly painful prolongation of the dying process, courts 
should not overrule guardian-physician-family decisions that withhold-
ing of treatment is the least detrimental alternative for the patient. 
That decision, reluctantly arrived at to be sure, far from degrading life 
or devaluating the social worth of such patients is an expression of the 
highest respect for life and individual dignity. As the New Jersey 
Supreme Court observed in the Quinlan case: 
Physicians ... have sometimes refused to treat the hopeless and dying as if 
they were curable ... . We think these attitudes represent a balanced imple-
mentation of a profoundly realistic perspective on the meaning of life and 
death and that they respect the whole Judeo-Christian tradition of respect 
for human life . 19 
Supreme Judicial Court Ruling 
On December 5, 1977 the Supreme Judicial Court released its long 
awaited opinion on the Saikewicz case. The Court chose to focus on 
three issues: the right of any person, competent or incompetent to 
decline life-prolonging treatment; the legal standard for non-compe-
tents; and the procedure to be followed in arriving at such a decision. 
Interestingly, the opinion, which is destined to be influential, con-
troversial, and widely debated, began with the admission that existing 
legal doctrine was unable to resolve the novel issues raised in the case. 
The Court, admitting that the law necessarily lags behind the most 
advanced thinking in every area, turned to the reflections of health 
. care, theology, moral ethics, and philosophy for guidance and insight 
on how to deal with terminally ill patients. 
One positive result is that for the first time in a major court 
opinion we find an acceptance of the distinction long used in medical 
ethics between ordinary and extraordinary means: "We should not use 
extraordinary means of prolonging life or its semblance when, after 
careful consideration ... it becomes apparent that there is no hope of 
recovery for the patient." 20 
Further, the Court concurred with the Quinlan court in adopting 
the Ramsey /Kubler-Ross thesis that we can and ought to distinguish 
between "curing the ill and comforting and easing the dying." It 
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accepted the stand that physicians ought not treat the hopeless and 
dying as if they were curable. They ought rather, in the Court's view, 
recognize that the dying are more in need of comfort than of treat-
ment. 
These positions, buttressed by recent developments in the law on 
informed consent and respect for the right of privacy, were the basis 
for the Court's authorization of the withholding of chemotherapy for 
Saikewicz. The Court acknowledged the state's interest in preserving 
life, but where that preservation is tendentious at best and attained 
only at traumatic cost, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized the 
right of an individual to forego that cost. 
In an interesting tum of the argument, the Court reversed the thesis 
that the value of life is lessened or cheapened by a decision to refuse 
treatment. It ruled that the value of life is diminished by the failure to 
allow a competent human being the right of choice and the right of 
privacy, i.e., the right to be left alone. 
The more difficult problem is the attribution of these rights to the 
incompetent. As was seen earlier there are those who argue stren-
uously that the state must always provide treatment of the incompe-
tent or risk devaluing their dignity and worth. The Supreme Judicial 
Court rejects that proposition and in a precedent shattering contribu-
tion to the developing trend in the law, ruled that "the principles of 
equality and respect for all individuals require that a choice exist for 
incompetents as well as competents." To do otherwise," it states, 
"would be to treat wards of the state as a person of lesser status or 
dignity than others." 
Having recognized the right of an incompetent to refuse life-pro-
longing treatment, the Court is faced with the awesome task in a case 
of first impression of framing an adequate rationale to explain how 
that right may be exercised. It does so with an interesting yoking of 
the long-standing legal doctrine of substituted judgment with a 
Rawlsian reconstruction of the mental world of a "rational" 
incompetent. 
Substituted judgment, a doctrine first articulated in English law 
over 150 years ago,21 deals with authorization of gifts from the estate 
of incompetents. The English court reasoned this could be done by 
"donning the mental mantle of the incompetent," i.e., what we might 
reasonably conclude the individual would do if he could understand 
his present situation. 
That theory of respect for the integrity and au,tonomy of all per-
sons finds renewed vigor in John Rawls' highly influential A Theory of 
Justice where he writes that maintaining the integrity of the person 
means that we act towards him "as we have reason to believe he would 
choose for himself if he were capable of reasoning and deciding ration-
ally." 22 This does not mean that we can impute preferences to him 
that he never held. But, as is true in the case of Saikewicz, where no 
August, 1978 245 
preferences have been made, our task is to ask how we would act for 
ourselves if we were in a similar position. 
Applying the substituted judgment theory to Saikewicz, the 
Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the Probate Court, the guard-
ian ad litem, the physicians, and the school staff all operated in the 
best interests of Joseph Saikewicz, i.e., they chose what appeared to 
be the least detrimental alternative available for the patient. It also 
observed that none of the parties used "quality-of-life" judgments as a 
value of the patient's life and that great care was taken to respect the 
worth of Saikewicz's life precisely because of his vulnerable status. 
The Court was particularly careful in its fashioning of the "quality-
of-life" statements to dispel any possible interpretation that the low 
quality of life of a mentally retarded individual was a determining 
factor in this case. It announced its regret that "the vague and perhaps 
ill-chosen term" had crept into the testimony. It also made explicit its 
understanding that the phrase as used referred to "the continuing state 
of pain and disorientation precipitated by the chemotherapy treat-
ment" and not to a "value of life" judgment. 
Procedure for Decisions 
The third item of the Court's concern, the procedure by which 
decisions to withhold life-prolonging treatment for non-competents is 
to be made, is of great interest to both the legal-medical community 
and to the public at large. It is also, perhaps, the least satisfactory and 
most controversial section of the opinion. 
The Court mandates that in questions of providing or withholding 
life-prolonging treatment from all alleged incompetents (not only state 
wards), a probate court determination of competency must be made. 
If the individual is adjudged incompetent, a guardian ad litem must be 
appointed who will represent the patient at a full adversarial hearing 
and he must defend the proposition that the treatment should be 
administered. The Court requires this procedure so that "all view-
points and alternatives will be aggressively pursued and examined." 
The effect of this ruling is to add full adversarial hearings with 
competing witnesses, opposing counsel, and the trauma of courtroom 
drama to the already stressful decision-making process involved in the 
withholding of treatment from the terminally ill non-competent 
patient. What this means at the practical level is that every time a 
patient suffering from a terminal illness lapses into disorientation, 
senility, or unconsciousness the family and physicians will be plunged 
into the un welcomed, cumbersome, and costly arena of litigation if 
they determine that further treatment is unwarranted. The predictable 
result will be the unnecessary continuation of the treatment by the 
physician and suffering for the patient and his family. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court foresaw that result and sought to 
obviate it by locating the decision-making mechanism within the 
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guardian-family-physician group subject in difficult or novel cases to 
ratification by a hospital ethics committee. It did so because it 
believed decisions on "the nature, extent, and duration of care" are 
primarily the physician's responsibility. Shifting that role to the courts 
was judged to be "a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profes-
sion's field of competence. It would also prove to be a time consuming 
and cumbersome process that would overburden already clogged 
courts. 
The Massachusetts bench feared no such results. In very specific 
terms it declared: "We reject the approach adopted by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court." In doing so, it appropriated to the courts the role of 
making all life and death decisions for every incompetent in the Com-
monwealth. It did this because in its phrasing "that responsibility is 
not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent the 
'morality and conscience of our society,' no matter how highly moti-
vated or impressively constituted." 
Conclusion 
I 
The Supreme Judicial Courtls disposition of the Saikewicz case has 
produced a landmark opinion that will influence both the substantive 
and procedural aspects of all future cases involving the withholding of 
medical care from terminally ill incompetent patients. 
On the substantive level the Court has definitively rejected the 
vitalist approach to medical treatment and has provided a legal frame-
work for the adoption of Christian moral attitudes on death and 
dying. It has also strengthened the trend of the law in according to 
incompetents the same rights exercised by all others. 
The procedural aspects of the case are more troubling. Since no 
distinction was made between long-term incompetents or state wards 
and those who because of age or illness are no longer able to make 
informed decisions for themselves, a large category of cases that would 
formerly be handled at the family-physician stage are now the subject 
matter of court deliberation. 
Despite the Court's distrust of other groups, judges are not gods 
nor philosophers' kings. Moreover, they are little equipped by training 
or experience for the type of decision-making they are now called 
upon to perform. Yet, now it will be only after a full scale judicial 
hearing that the family and physician of a terminally ill incompetent 
patient may effect what the Court itself acknowledges as the duty "of 
( only) caring for the dying. " Such is the strange and strained legacy of 
a case begun to ease the burden of a dying Joseph Saikewicz. 
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